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The paper examines results presented by Marette, Crespi and Schiavina in an article 
entitled the role of common labeling in a context of asymmetric information (1999).  They 
show that, given high cost of labeling, a cartel that provides information about product 
quality may improve overall welfare even if producers collude to reduce quantity 
competition.  This study extends their model and programs it as a mixed complementarity 
model, to account for demand of low quality products under certification.  It is found that 
the firms differentiate the high and low quality consumers.  Unlike the results by Marette, 
Crespi, and Schiavina, the welfare impact is ambiguous.  It is concluded that the model 
presented here can be further developed in an empirical setting. 
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II. Introduction 
Households in the Western Hemisphere are no longer self sufficient in food 
production.  Rather, the majority purchase food from a third party seller, e.g. from a 
restaurant, retailer, and grocery store etc.  Viewing the product only from the shelves 
makes it difficult for the consumer to gain insight in the production practices and the 
quality attributes to the product.   
Formally, we can describe this as the food products purchased from a grocery store 
contain less search characteristic.  Thus, the consumer cannot determine the quality of the 
product a priori the purchase.  Instead the food products are characterized to be more of 
experience (quality is revealed after purchase) or credence characteristic (quality is not 
revealed even after purchase).   
Although it is not possible to determine the quality of the packaged food product on 
the shelves, the issues concerning food product quality are not trivial issues in society.  The 
consumers may boycott not only food that can contain food-borne diseases, but also 
products that may be considered processed or produced in an unethical or hazardous 
method for the environment.  For example, the linkage between the BSE (Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopati) in beef and CJD (Creutzfeld-Jakobs Disease) in humans 
changed the consumption pattern rapidly in Europe, although not all countries reported 
occurrence of BSE.  Frewer, Risvik and Shifferstein (2001), and Westgren (1999) 
scrutinize the impact of changing consumers’ preferences vis-à-vis the implications of the 
structure in the food-marketing chain.   
Consequently, these issues create incentives for the agribusiness firm to design 
programs for differentiating food products on basis of perceived quality aspects.  Producers 
supplying products that appeal to the consumers’ taste have incitement to differentiate their 
products by other means than the pricing mechanism.  The differentiation process is carried 
out through implementation of quality policy-, or certification programs.  Certification 
programs and organizations like ISO, USDA, FAIRTRADE, CROP-WATCH, PDO, PGI, 
and Organic Europe, distinguish the product quality in terms of in production process, 
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economic implications of quality, or certification programs in agricultural markets, e.g. see 




When one or several stages in the food chain join to establish specific quality 
standards, both producers and consumers might reap economic gains through lowered 
uncertainty and increased efficiency.  On the contrary, there is also a probability that the 
development of quality policy programs may further enhance market power, thus offset the 
potential social gains of the program.  In essence, a certification program used by 
individual stages in the agribusiness chain may lead to vertical or horizontal cooperation 
(collusion), thus potentially incurring costs upon their factor and product markets. 
From an economist point of view, it is not feasible to rationalize which quality or 
quantity a firm should strive for, without first analyzing relevant information concerning 
the production process and the demand situation in the relevant product markets.  Amongst 
others, Marette, Crespi, and Schiavina (1999) observe that agricultural markets are 
working imperfectly due to asymmetric information, since the consumers lack perfect 
information about the product quality.  The suppliers, on the other hand, have incentives to 
produce both high and low quality products, although the consumers always prefer the 
higher quality products.   
The authors hypothesize that the societal welfare increases if consumers can 
distinguish between high quality and low quality products.  Marette et al test this 
hypothesis by developing a partial equilibrium model (henceforth called the base model) 
under imperfect information in two elaborate scenarios.  Topics concerning quality, 
vertical product differentiation, and signaling are popular topics in the industrial 
organization literature and it encompasses a broad range of various modeling frameworks.  
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The model derived by Marette et al treats labeling in agricultural markets in a 
delicate way.  With the certification scheme in place the consumer are able to distinguish 
between high and low quality products.  However, the certification implies that the high 
quality producers gain market power.  The low quality producers are no longer producing, 
and the high quality producers can exercise market power by tacitly colluding or acting as 
Cournot quantity setters.  Essentially, they show that the societal welfare increases when 
high quality producers come together in a certification scheme and eliminate asymmetric 
information.   
Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that the assumptions build in the partial 
equilibrium framework drives the results.  First, the authors choose to use a demand 
function, which strictly discriminates high quality from low quality products.  Second, the 
authors’ assumes that all firms have access to the same technology and have identical 
marginal cost of production.  Third, the certification scheme does not alter the high quality 
firms’ marginal cost. 
Thus, it is perceived necessary to extend the model to analyze the same set of 
issues.  Relaxing the assumptions for developing an empirically testable model may show 
that unlike the results by Marette et al, the welfare impact is ambiguous. 
 
IV. Objective and Outline 
The objective of this study is to analyze certification programs and its impact on 
the market structure using a programmable mixed complementarity model.  This study 
continues developing the model from Marette et al.  Specifically, this study attempts to 
relief some of the rather restrictive assumptions on consumer and producer behavior that 
Marette et al have in their paper. 
The outline of the paper is as follows.  The subsequent sections present the model 
and the derived results Marette et al.  Continuing, a few of the restrictive assumptions are 
relieved and its implications analyzed further.  The paper concludes by discussing the 
discrepancies and commonalities with the Marette et al’s findings, and finally comments 
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V. Conceptual Framework  
The demand structure in the Marette et al paper is specified so that consumption of 
low quality products incurs a disutility upon the consumers.  Under asymmetric 
information, the low quality producers can sell their low quality produce, although 
knowingly, the consumers would not be willing to purchase a low quality product per se.  
Consequently, the suppliers have incentives to produce both high and low quality products, 
although the consumers always prefer the higher quality products.   
Numerous studies in vertical product differentiation specify the indirect utility 
function so that more quality is strictly preferred to less.  Vertical product differentiation 
models are developed and analyzed, although not exclusively, by, Mussa and Rosen 
(1978), Peitz (1997, 2000), Tirole (1988), and Vives (2001).  A classical approach is to 
specify the consumer’s indirect utility-function rather than direct demand: 
 
 (***)    () p k p k D − ⋅ =θ , , 
where the quality of the product is described by the parameter k.  Additionally, consumers 
differ in taste, described by the uniformly distributed parameter  [] 1 , 0 ∈ θ .  The linear 
indirect utility function can be thought of as a first-order Taylor series expansion of the 
true underlying indirect utility function.  Tirole (1988: p.96), and later Motta (1993: 
p.115), interpret the parameterθ as the marginal rate of substitution between income and 
quality.  Hence, as θ approaches its upper limit the marginal utility of income decreases, or 
alternatively, the income increases.   
It may be somewhat dubious to define what the quality parameter k really 
represents.  The quality parameter may represent a label that ensures the product is free 
from diseases, genetically modified organisms, organic produce or alike.  This study views 
the parameter as product differentiation parameter.  However, due to asymmetric 
information buyers and other sellers cannot observe the quality level.  As in line with most 
studies, Marette et al set kl to zero so that no buyers would knowingly purchase a low-
quality product (this appears to be a rather popular assumption, e.g. see the most recent 
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On the producer side, Marette et al assumes that there are only two high quality 
firms (nH=2), and five low quality firms ( L n =5).  The low quality producers cannot 
provide high quality products.  Crespi states that the numbers of high quality producers are 
arbitrarily chosen:  
 
If we can show that a cartel that colludes in quantities can actually benefit consumers, then it doesn't 
really matter whether nH=2, 3, 100.  (2002, personal communication).   
Furthermore, the marginal cost of production is identical for all producers and equal to 
zero.  Hotelling, for example argues that the inclusion of cost may be a trivial task: 
 
This condition of no cost is not essential to the existence of such profits.  If a constant cost of 
production per unit had been introduced in the calculations above, it would simply have been added 
to the prices without affecting the profits.  Fixed overhead charges are to be subtracted from π1 and 
π2, but may leave a substantial residuum.  These gains are not compensation for risk, since they 
represent a minimum return.  (1929: p.51) 
This is an analytically tractable approach: numerous studies on product 
differentiation set the marginal cost of production to zero. 
 
VI. Solution Practice 
The product differentiation model by Marette et.al. is set up as a mixed 
complementarity problem.  Ferris and Pang (1997); Murphy, Sherali, and Soyster (1982); 
and Bazaraa, Sherali, and Shetty (1993), provide extensive discussions of mixed 
complementarity methodology relevant for economic problem solvers.  The objective of 
mixed complementarity problems is to solve for stationary points in a Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker convex programming context.  The primal profit function for a firm is specified as: 
 
(***)   () () q c q Q p − ∗ = π , 
where  () Q p  is the inverse demand, q the firm’s output level, Q the aggregate the output 
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and the complementarity condition is specified as:  
 
























where  0 , 0 ≥ ∂ ∂ ≥ q q π  so that when the output level is positive, the first order condition 
must hold with equality.   
The market clearing condition is: 
 
(***)   () p Q q
i i ≥ ∑
∗ , 
that is, aggregate supply must be at least as large as demand.  The complementarity 
problem for the market clearing condition is specified as: 
 
(***)   () [ ] 0 = − ⋅∑
∗
i i
e p Q q p , 
where 
e p  is the market clearing price.   
The producers can either tacitly collude or set quantity independently in a Cournot 
game.  The solution {} n i qi .. 1 = ∈
∗  to the Cournot game constitutes Nash equilibrium.  An 
outcome is Nash equilibrium if no player would find it beneficial to deviate if no players 
deviate from their strategies played at the Nash outcome.  Formally, for all producers i and 
j, this is described as: 
 
(***)   () () i i i i i i i q q q q ∀ ≥ − − − , ,
* * π π . 
The advantage of programming the Nash-Cournot game as a mixed 
complementarity framework lies on the numerical plane, rather than on the analytical.  The 
mixed complementarity can find a numerical approximation to the market clearing 
equilibrium for analytically intractable problems.   
With this approach, it is also possible to find equilibrium for multiple demands and 
firms with different production technology (it is assumed initially that each producer has 
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VII.  Nash-Cournot: No Certification 
Recall that the base scenario assumes that nL=5, nH=2, and that the high quality 
parameter kH is equal to unity, whereas the low quality parameter kL is zero.  With no 
certification, the consumers are not able to distinguish between the high and low quality 
products and base their consumption decision on the expected quality.  The expected 
quality is:  l h n k k + = 2 * 2 .  The marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying 
the product or not has the taste parameter:  k p/ 0 = θ .  Consequently, total demand can be 
described as:  k p Q / 1 1 0 − = − = θ .  Derivations follow in appendix. 















1 1 1 1 * ] 1 [ * ∑ ∑ = = − − = = π , 
and the associate first order condition is: 
 
(***)   0 ] 1 [ 1
1





q k Q k
q
π . 
Solve for the optimal quantity,  125 . ) 3 ( 1 = + = l n q .  Total output is  875 . = Q  and the market-
clearing price is  0357 . = p .  The profit for each firm is  0357 . =
∗ H
m π .  Moreover, since it is 
assumed that the per unit cost is identical for both the high and low quality producers, the 
output and consequently the profit is equal.   
Turning the focus to the consumer surplus: 
 
(***)   () θ θ
θ d p k CS
e ∫ − =
1
0
 = .109. 
Consequently, the total welfare with no certification is equal to     
 
(***)   141 .
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VIII. Nash-Cournot  with  Certification 
Marette et al assume that the consumer is able to distinguish between the high-
quality and low-quality products when the high quality producers signal their quality in a 
certification program.  Due to the theoretical construct of the demand the consumers never 
have desire to buy low quality products. 
Hence, the certification program also implies that there are no low-quality 
producers contained in the market.  The model is straightforward in that there is no 
asymmetric information with a certification scheme: all high quality producers have 
incentive to commit to the higher quality.  Consequently, there are only two producers with 
identical marginal cost they also earn the same profit when playing the Nash-Cournot 
game. 
The marginal consumer can be identified as  p kh − = 0 0 θ Æ  h k p = 0 θ , and the 
inverse demand is  ] 1 [ Q k p h − = . 
The profit for each of the two high quality producers is: 
 
(***)   2 * 1 C q p
h − = π  =  2 * ] 1 [ 1 C q Q k
H
h − −  =  2 ] 1 [ 1 2 1 C q q q kh − − − ,  
where C is a fixed cost of establishing the certification scheme.   
The associated first order condition is: 
 
(***)   ] 1 [ * ] [ ] 1 [ 1
1









and solving for q1  we get the best response function:  ()( ) 2 1 2 2
*
1 q q q − = .  Since both high 
quality producers have the same marginal cost, they have identical best response functions.  




1 = = q q , and the market clearing price is 
] 1 [ Q k p h
e − =  =  3 h k =.333.  Consequently, the profit for each high quality producer is: 
  




1 C kh − = = π π . 
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(***)   () θ θ
θ d p k CS
e




Consequently, the total welfare under certification is:  
 
(***)   C k CS W H
H H − ⋅ = + + = 9 4 2 1 π π . 
 
IX. Collusion with Certification 
Under collusion, the high-quality sellers collude on quantities and share the cost of 




1 q q Q + = .  
The cartel’s profit is:  
 
(***)   C Q p collusion − = * π  =  C Q Q kh − − * ] 1 [,  
the F.O.C. is: 
 
(***)   ] [ ] 1 [ Q k Q k
Q
h h − − =
∂
∂π




− − Q Q kh ,  




1 = = q q , and  ] 1 [ Q k p h
e − =  =  500 . .   










 = .500. 
Consequently, the producer profit is:  
 
(***)   2
* * C q p
e − ∗ = π  =  2 8 C kh − . 
The consumer surplus is: 
(***)   () θ θ
θ d p k CS
e







so the total welfare is equal to:  
 
(***)   ( ) C k collusive CS W H
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X.  Base Model: Summary of Scenarios 
The table below provides a summary of the base model developed by Marette et al.  
The model is programmed in GAMS as a mixed complementarity problem (see appendix).  
The last column presents the numerical estimates of consumer and producer surplus with 
(fictitious) data for high and low quality parameters; kl=0 and kh=1.  In lieu with the 
Marette et al study, there are only two high quality producers and five low quality 
producers in the market.  The total cost of establishing the certification scheme is set to 
0.15.   
 
Table 1.  Qualitative summary of Marette's paper. 
Strategy Output  level Market  clearing 
prices 




         
No 








e p  CS=.109  00446 .
































e p   CS=.125  0500 .
* = π   W = .225 
* Base model programmed in GAMS with the following parameter values: nh=2; nl=5; kl=0; kh=1; C=.15 
 
Essentially, the certification program internalizes the externalities through labeling, 
as it eliminates asymmetric information.  The consumer surplus’ increases from 0.109 to 
0.222 units with certification and two Nash-Cournot producers.  When the high quality 
producers collude on quantities, and act as a joint monopolist, the consumer surplus’ 
increases to 0.125 units.  
If the high quality firms could construct an enforcing collusive certification 
scheme, the per-producers profit would increase from 0.036 to 0.05 units when going from 
a Nash-Cournot behavior to acting as a joint monopolist.  For a reasonable cost of 
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(***)   ion Certificat No Collusion π π > ,  
and  
 
(***)   [] [] Collusion Collusion h t NashCourno h t NashCourno C k C k π π = − < − = 2 4 1 2 9 1.  
However, since the marginal profit of producing an additional unit for the 
individual producer is strictly positive, the collusion cannot be Nash equilibrium.  Recall 
the individual firm’s first order conditions: 
 

















thus, the high quality producer have a strictly positive marginal profit of producing more 
units than the agreed allotment.  Unless there is not a formal treatise that forbids 
production more than the allotment from the collusion game, this is not a stable 
equilibrium. 
  Given the existing numbers of producers (two high quality, and five low quality, 
respectively), the total welfare ranking is:  
 
(***)   C k W C k W
k
W H Cert H collusive
H
no − ⋅ = < − ⋅ = <
⋅
= 9 4 8 3
64
9 ,  
i.e. the welfare under certification is strictly higher than under no certification (and 
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XI.  Modification of Demand: No Certification  
Recall the specification of the indirect utility function: 
 
(***)   () p k p k D − ⋅ =θ ,.  
The specification raises mainly three concerns whether if it is an optimal theoretical 
representation.  First, it is unclear whether the linear approximation is a good 
representation of consumer behavior for large perturbations of pries and quality.  Peitz 
(1995, 1997, and 2000) make several attempts of deriving an aggregate consumer demand 
from the perspective of horizontal and vertical product differentiation perspective.  
The second issue is whether indirect utility function exhausts all necessary features 
of vertical product differentiation.  The quality variables may not solely assume the 
extreme points 0 and 1 in terms of the utility function.  Under full information, the 
simplifying assumption that kl  is zero drives the low quality producers out of the 
marketplace.  Thus, the theoretical construct could also allow for a dynamic representation, 
with both low and high quality producers represented on the market under full information.   
Marette et al note this issue: 
 
The basic model could also be extended to permit low quality […] greater than zero.  In this case, 
buyers who have a low willingness to pay prefer low-quality products.  Results are similar to the 
basic model because only high-quality sellers have an incentive to certify their products […].   
(1999: p. 174) 
However, these results are not elaborated on within the paper.  Motta (1993) develops 
these issues further for the case with two competing producers and find that product 
differentiation always arises at equilibrium.  Hence, in lieu with Motta’s spirit, this study 
proceeds by deriving conditions for when  0 ≠ l k , i.e. when low quality products do not 
cause a disutility upon consumption for all consumers.  Analogous with previous section, 
we find the marginal consumer, the associate first order conditions, consumer surplus and 
producer profit, respectively. 
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(***)   () ( ) l l l h n k n k k + ∗ + ∗ = 2 2 . 
The marginal consumer has the taste parameter  k p/ 0 = θ .  Consequently, total demand is:  
 
(***)   k p Q / 1 1 0 − = − = θ . 
Since all seven firms are symmetric, the Nash-Cournot game yields symmetric solutions, 
i.e. all seven firms have the same profit.  The profit is defined as: 
 







l , ] 1 [
2
1 1 ∀ ∈ ⋅ − − ⋅ = ⋅ = ∑ ∑ = = π , 
and the F.O.C. is: 
 









m q Q k
q
π , 
and the output level per firm is  8 1 ) 3 ( 1 = + = L n q , and the total market output is 
875 . ) 3 ( ) 2 ( = + + = L L n n Q .  The marginal consumer is located at the distance 
() 125 . 3 1 1 0 = + = − = L n Q θ .  Since consumer have utility of consuming low quality products, 
0 ≠ l k , the market-clearing price is somewhat different from the base model: 
 
(***)   H L





The profit for each firm is:  
 






π .   
Consumer surplus is:  
 
(***)   () θ θ
θ d p k CS
e ∫ − =
1
0










  16 




45 .   
Thus, in the scenario with no certification, but where the consumers have 
preferences for low quality products yields a higher welfare, than when kL=0, ceteris 
paribus:  
 








0   
 
XII.  Modified Demand: Certification 
With certification, the two high quality sellers certify the produce, and the low 
quality sellers serve the fringe demand.  Essentially, this situation resembles a traditional 




Figure 1.  The product differentiation case. 
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The vertical axis measures consumers’ utility, and the horizontal axis the 
population taste distribution parameter θ.  The utility for high quality goods are UH=θ*kH, 
and for the low quality goods UL=θ*kL.  It is easy to be betrayed that the figure resembles 
an upward sloping demand curve.  Rather, the figure depicts the utility as a function of the 
uniformly distributed taste distribution parameter. 
Recalling the base model, we note that kl=0, or in words: there is no demand for 
low quality products.  This particular utility is depicted in the figure by the (indirect) utility 
function U=θ*E[k], where E[k] is the expected quality level under no certification. 
With certification, the qualitative difference with the base model is that there are 
effectively two active “demands”, or more precisely utilities associated with consumption: 
UH and UL, for differentiated products and one for non-differentiated, respectively. 
This particular model has two types of marginal consumers: those indifferent 
between buying either product, and those indifferent between buying nothing and the low 
quality product.    First, the marginal consumer that is indifferent between consuming 
either product is described by the taste parameter θ0: 
 
(***)   L L H H p k p k − = − 0 0 θ θ , 
or, alternatively: 
 








Consequently, the demand for high quality products is: 
 









The marginal consumer at θ00 is indifferent between consuming nothing and the low 
quality product.  Solving for θ00: 
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The demand for the low quality product is: 
 













The inverse demands are: 
 
(***)   L L H H H H k Q k Q k p − − = , 
and 
 
(***)   () L L H L k Q Q p − − = 1 . 
Since  0 ≠ L k , the demands are inversely dependent on the degree of substitutability.  
Hence, this case is similar to the product differentiation case. 
 The optimal output level for each high and low quality producer is found through 
their respective first order conditions.  The profit for the high quality producer is: 
 
(***)   () 2 * 1 1 1 C q k Q k Q k q p
H
L L H H H
H H − − − = = π , 
and the first order condition is: 
 
(***)   () 0 1
1
1 = − − − =
∂
∂ H
H L L H H H H
H
q k k Q k Q k
q
π . 











k q k Q k
i q q q
⋅
⋅ − ⋅ −
= =
2
5 .. 1 , , 2
2 1
. 
By analogy, the profit for the (first) low quality producer is: 
 
(***)   ()
L
L L H
L L q k Q Q q p 1 1 1 1 ⋅ ⋅ − − = ⋅ = π , 
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(***)   () 0 1 1
1





L L H H L
L
k q k Q k Q
q
π , 
so the best response function for the (first) low quality producer is: 
 



















q Q q . 
The optimal output levels for each firm is found by solving the systems of best 
response functions, or by solving the respective first order conditions.  Note that 




i .. 1 ,
* * = ∀ = , so: 
 











by analogy, the optimal output level for each of the two high-quality firms is: 
 
(***)   [] 2 .. 1
10 18




































The corresponding market clearing price for high quality products with certification 
is: 
 
(***)   ()
L H
h l h
  h k k
k k 5 - k 6














l k 10 - k 18
k k
  = p
⋅ ⋅
⋅ . 
Consequently, the marginal consumer between buying the high or low quality 
product is defined as: 
 
(***)    
L H
H





and the marginal consumer between buying the low quality product and nothing is defined 
as: 
 
(***)    
L H
H
00 k 10 - k 18
k
=   θ
⋅ ⋅
 
The profit for the high quality producers are: 
 





k k 5 - k 6





l h H H





= =π π , 


















i π , 
The profit ratio between the low and high quality producer is equal to:  
 
(***)   ()
2
L H l H
H L k k k k   ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ = 5 6 π π , 
That is, in the extreme case where the consumer obtains identical utility from consuming 
the high and low quality products, there is no difference in profit.  The subsequent section 
discusses this result further.  The consumers’ surplus from consuming the high quality 
products are: 
 

















− = − =∫ H H H H p
k
d p k CS







k 5 - k 9
k 5 - k 6 k 3
⋅ ⋅
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 
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− = − =∫ L L L L p
k
d p k CS
L  =  ()
()










so the total consumer surplus is: 
 









k 5 - k 9




⋅ = + = . 
The analytical expression for total welfare is: 
 
(***)   ( )
()
C
k 5 - k 9











i TOT ion Certificat −
⋅ ⋅
⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅




π π . 
 
XIII. Modified  Demand:  Summary 
Numerical estimates for the no-certification and certification scenario are summarized in 
the table below.  Collusive action is omitted, since the producer always has incentive to 
deviate from collusive quantity due to the existence of positive marginal profit.  
 
Table 2.  Numerical estimates with the extended Marette model. 
Strategy Numerical  estimates
*  
 Output  level  Prices  Consumers’ 
surplus 
Producers’ profit 
(per producer)  Total welfare 
          
No 
certification 
qL= qH= .125 
Q=.875  p




qH = .269 
qL = .077 
QH = .538 
QL =.385 
pH = .538 
pL = .077  
CSLow = .089 
CSHigh = .393 
CSTOT  = .482 
πH = .145 
πL = .006 
W = .741 
* Base model programmed in GAMS with the following parameter values: nh=2; nl=5; kl=1; kh=2; C=0.15 
The result from collusive behavior is not presented here, as it is not a Nash equilibrium 
 
Constructing a utility function that permits demand for low quality products yield 
rather interesting results as both low quality and high quality producers can coexist under 
certification.  The (aggregate) output level increases from .875 to .923 units with 
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non-certified product: the high quality products are seven times expensive than the low 
quality (non-certified) product.  Essentially, with certification the consumers’ surplus and 
low quality producers profit decreases, whereas the high quality producers profit increases.   
  The producer profit high quality producers increases from .02 to .145 units since 
they produce more units of output to higher price.  The low quality producers on the other 
hand serve the fringe market with relatively small prices, and their profit decreases to .006 
units.  The consumer on the other hand, looses roughly half of the surplus with the 
certification scheme. 
 
XIV.  Perturbation of Quality Parameter and Cost of Certification 
It is notable that the overall welfare increases from 0.633 to 0.741 units when the 
high quality producers market their produce under a common labeling.  Marette et al 
emphasize upon this particular point (c.f. first comment by Crespi): 
 
The basic model could also be extended to permit low quality, kl, greater than zero.  In this case, 
buyers who have a low willingness to pay prefer low-quality products.  Results are similar to the 
basic model [no certification, author’s note] because only high-quality sellers have an incentive to 
certify their products, because of higher profits under perfect information…  (1999: p. 174) 
 
However, the results are not stable for larger perturbations of the quality 
parameters, kL and kH, and the cost of certification, C.  For example, the society as a whole 
is indifferent between certification and no certification when:  
 
(***)   ion Certificat NoC W W = , 
or, alternatively expressed in terms of kL and kH, and the cost of certification, C: 
 















k 5 - k 9
k 45 k k k k 289 - k
C
⋅ ⋅
⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
⋅ = . 
That is, given that kL=1 and kH=2, the highest cost that is leaves the society 
indifferent with certification is 0.25577 units: recall that the current model assumes C is 
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As noted from the expression above, as kL approaches kH, the welfare impact 
becomes ambiguous.  Given the cost of certification C=0.15 and the high quality 
parameter kH=2, for small perturbations of kL, the welfare impact become ambiguous.  For 
example when kL is above 1.338 units, there is a negative impact on the society when the 
high quality sellers certify their produce. 
 
XV.  Varying the Number of Producers 
This first section explores the case when varying the number of high quality 
producers, ceteris paribus (n b the cost of certification is set to zero for nH>10).  The table 
below reports the results of the simulation.  Each scenario reports the numerical results of 
no certification versus certification.   
When there are no high quality producers on the market, the low quality producers supply 
the whole market.  As the high quality producers increase in number, the Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium approaches the competitive market outcome, i.e. the market price approaches 
the firm’s marginal cost.  Hence, as the market price approaches zero, each producer 
supplies an infinite small unit of output, and the total welfare approaches unity.   
With certification, there is a clear trend towards the low quality producers 
becoming fringe suppliers.  Although supplier serves a fringe demand, the profit has not 
necessarily to be lower.  However, in this case, the high quality producer’s profit is 
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 High*  Low**  High* Low**  High* Low**   
0
##  .167 .167  .347  .028 .486 
w/c
###  - .167 -  .167 .347  - .028  .486 
              
1  .143 .167  .429  .024 .571 
w/c  .368 .105 .737  .105  .468  .122 .011  .645 
              
2  .125 .161  .492  .020 .632 
w/c  .269 .077 .539  .077  .571  .070 .006  .741 
              
3  .111 .153  .543  .017 .679 
w/c  .212 .061 .424  .061  .644  .040 .004  .782 
              
4  .100 .144  .585  .014 .715 
w/c  .175 .050 .350  .050  .696  .024 .003  .804 
              
5  .090 .136  .620  .012 .744 
w/c  .145 .043 .298  .042  .736  .014 .002  .817 
              
6  .083 .129  .649  .011 .767 
w/c  .130 .037 .259  .037  .767  .009 .001  .825 
              
7  .077 .122  .675  .009 .799 
w/c  .115 .033 .230  .033  .790  .005 .001  .830 
              
8  .071 .115  .696  .008 .804 
w/c  .103 .030 .206  .029  .810  .002  .0009  .834 
              
9  .067 .110  .716  .007 .818 
w/c  .093 .027 .187  .023  .823  .001  .0007  .837 
              
10  .063 .104  .732  .007 .830 
w/c  .085 .024 .171  .024  .840  -.0004  .0006  .839 
w/c***  .085 .024 .171  .024  .840  .0146  .0006  .989 
20  .038 .069  .832  .003 .899 
w/c***  .046 .013 .092  .013  .911  .004  .0002  .997 
40  .022 .041  .904  .0009  .944 
w/c***  .024 .007 .048  .007  .953  .001  .00005  .999 
50  .018 .034  .921  .0006  .954 
w/c***  .019 .006 .039  .006  .962  .0007  .00003  .999 
100  .009 .018  .956  .0002  .976 
w/c***  .009 .003 .020  .003  .981  .0002 ~0  ~1 
Perturbations based on model programmed in Maple; 
# 5 low quality producers; Parameter values: kl=1; 
kh=2; C=0.15; 
##No certification: high and low quality producers have identical output levels; 
###Certification; w/c = scenario with certification; w/c *** = scenario with certification, but the certification 
cost is set to zero ; * High = High quality producers output level, unit price, and profit, respectively; ** Low=  
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Next, the number of low quality producers is varied, ceteris paribus, e.g. number of 
high quality producers, cost of certification and quality are held constant. 












 High*  Low**  High* Low**  High* Low**   
0
##  .333 .667  .444  .222 .889 
w/c
###  .333  .667   .444 .147   .739 
              
1  .25 .417  .469  .104  .781 
w/c  .300 .200 .600  .200  .500  .105  .04  .750 
              
2  .200 .300  .480  .060 .720 
w/c  .286 .143 .571  .143  .531  .088 .020  .748 
              
3  .167 .233  .486  .389 .681 
w/c  .278 .111 .556  .111  .549  .079 .012  .745 
              
4  .143 .191  .490  .027 .653 
w/c  .273 .091 .546  .091  .562  .074 .008  .743 
              
5  .125 .161  .492  .020 .633 
w/c  .269 .077 .539  .077  .571  .070 .006  .741 
              
6  .111 .139  .494  .015 .617 
w/c  .267 .067 .533  .067  .578  .067 .004  .739 
              
7  .10 .122  .495  .012  .605 
w/c  .265 .059 .529  .059  .583  .065 .003  .738 
              
8  .091 .109  .496  .010 .595 
w/c  .263 .053 .526  .053  .587  .064 .003  .736 
              
9  .083 .098  .497  .008 .587 
w/c  .262 .048 .524  .048  .591  .062 .002  .736 
              
10  .077 .090  .497  .007 .580 
w/c  .261 .043 .522  .043  .594  .061 .002  .735 
20  .04 .047  .499  .002  .544 
w/c  .256 .023 .512  .023  .608  .056 .001  .731 
40  .023 .024  ~.500  .001 .524 
w/c  .253 .012 .506  .012  .616  .053  .0001  .728 
50  .019 .020  ~.500  .0004  .519 
w/c  .252 .010 .505  .010  .618  .052  .00009  .727 
100  .010 .010  .500  .0001  .510 
w/c  .251 .005 .503  .005  .621  .051  .00002  .726 
              
Perturbations based on model programmed in Maple; 
# 2 high quality producers; Parameter values: kl=1; 
kh=2; C=0.15; 
##No certification: high and low quality producers have identical output levels; 
###Certification; w/c = scenario with certification; * High = High quality producers output level, unit price, 
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When there are two high producers serving the market, the expected quality equals 
the high quality.  Therefore, with certification the high quality producers’ profit is lower 
due to the cost of certification.   
As the number of low-quality-firms increase, the consumers’ surplus increase, but 
decreases the each firm’s profit.  The output for the high quality producer approaches 0.25 
as the number of low quality producer increase.  The figure below displays how the total 



















Figure 2.  Welfare impact vs. number of low quality firms. 
 
The figure depicts an interesting pattern.  Although the consumers’ surplus is 
strictly higher under certification, the total welfare impact of a certification scheme is 
ambiguous.  For  2 = ≤ H L n n , the welfare impact of a certification scheme is negative.  In 
addition, the welfare is decreasing with the number of low quality providers.  
  The qualitative difference between varying the number of high and low quality 
firms is that the welfare is increasing in the number of high quality producer, whereas the 
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XVI. Product  Differentiation 
The differences in price charged and market quantities warrant further discussion.  
Recall the relation of the inverse demands for high and low quality products: 
L L H H H H k Q k Q k p − − = , and  () L L H L k Q Q p − − = 1 .  Hotelling (1929) noted this essential 
point and claims that: 
   
It is the gradualness in the shifting of customers from one merchant to another as their prices vary 
independently which is ignored in the examples worked out by Cournot, Amoroso, and Edgeworth 
[authors note: the latter consider homogeneous products].  The assumption, implicit in their work, 
that all buyers deal with the cheapest seller leads to a type of instability which disappears when the 
quality sold by each is considered as a continuous function of the differences in price.  […]  So only 
in theory of value a market is usually considered as a point in which only one price can obtain; but 
for some purposes it is better to consider a market as an extended region.  (1929: p. 44) 
Shy (1995: pp. 136) provide some intuition of the results: using the own and cross 
quantity terms for each inverse demand, it is possible to analyze the price responsiveness, 
or the degree of product differentiation.  The own and cross terms are () L H k k , , respectively 
for the high quality; and () L k  for the low quality.  Containing the high quality and the low 
quality prices in the indirect utility function allow consumers to base their decision on 
quality and price.  Essentially, consumers of the high quality products perceive that the 
high- and low-quality products appear being highly differentiated:  
 

















or, in words, as  0 → δ , the change in the price of the low quality product has a negligible 
impact on the high quality product. 
   In contrast, consumers buying low quality products perceive that the products are 
almost homogeneous to the high quality products. 
   











hence, the low-quality consumers perceive that the price has a stronger impact on both 
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elastic segment of consumers.  The inelastic high quality type has a strictly higher 
willingness to pay for high quality products.  The second type, on the other hand, also likes 
high quality, but is more sensitive to price changes than the high quality type.  
 
XVII. Further Extensions  
This section outlines further extensions of the product differentiation model 
developed by Marette et al.  The subsequent section discusses the possibility of extending 
the demand to a non-linear demand type to account for larger perturbations of prices and 
quantities.  The next section discusses re-specification of the production technology and 
the associate marginal cost.  Finally, the last section discusses the implications of relieving 
some of the restrictive assumptions on market behavior entry/exit. 
 
XVIII. Demand  Specification II: Non-Linear Demand 
The linear demand curve can be seen as a first order Taylor series expansion of the 
“true” demand function.  However, the linear approximation is a poor representation of 
reality under large perturbations.  An alternative route is to utilize a second-order Taylor-
series expansion and specifically model demand as a quadratic, CES or a translog utility 
function, see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) or Pollack and Wales (1992).  Essentially, a 
general (non)-linear function of quality and the population distribution parameter can be 
thought of as: 
 
(***)   () ( ) () L H L L L k p p h k f D , ; , , ; θ θ , 
and  
 
(***)   () ( ) () H H L H H k p p h k f D , ; , , ; θ θ , 
for the low and high quality products, respectively.  Furthermore,  () θ ; k f  is a general 
utility function of the quality conditional on the population distribution parameter θ, and 
() θ ; ,k p h  are the interaction between the quality and the price term conditional on the 
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    It is possible to specify the quality function, () θ ; k f , in analogous development 
with the utility-separability framework.  For separability, e.g. see Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980: pp. 127,133).  Hence, the quality function () θ ; k f , could be regarded as a “demand-
shift-parameter” (Roberts, Josling and Orden; 1999). 
 
XIX. Production  Technology 
Historically, studies on product differentiation circumvent the specification of the 
production technology, by assuming zero marginal cost; see the references made by 
Martin, Motta, and Tirole.  For example, Motta develops a framework for vertical 
differentiation models, allowing for the existence of a fixed cost associated with the choice 
of quality.  The firms decide qualities in the first period, and set the quantities in the 
second and final period.  In the final period, however, the incurred costs in the first period 
are already sunk and do not enter into the decision process, e.g. R&D expenditures, 
advertising, brand promotion campaigns, etc. 
Modeling farm production is an inherently challenging task.  Heady and Dillon 
(1961), Shumway et al (1984), and Beattie and Taylor (1993), discusses suitable 
representations for the agricultural technology.  In essence, engaging in a certification 
scheme (e.g. organic farming), may force the firm to adopt new technology (e.g. substitute 
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XX.  Specification of the Marginal Cost Function 
Recent studies introduce ownership structures, returns to scale, and cost of 
production in the vertical differentiation framework: see Amacher et al. (2001), Hoffman, 
Martin, and Sexton (2000).  Essentially, recent studies indicate that the choice of 
appropriate cost/technology appear provide value for analyzing market behavior in 
agricultural markets.  Thus, it is appropriate to account for the production technology at the 
production stages.  Analytical expressions for farm-level output supply can be derived by 
using duality theory, e.g. see Lau and Yotopoulos (1972).  The advantage with duality 
theory is that it is possible to find closed form expressions for supply without explicitly 
specifying the production technology. 
Additionally, the certification scheme usually involves more than one stage of the 
food marketing chain and it may be incorrect to analyze one specific stage in isolation.  
Sexton provides a conceptual framework for analyzing the dynamics of the food marketing 
chain.  For example, Sexton (2000: p1090) the relation between the farm gate price P
f and 
the consumer price, P
r is: 
 




















where  η is the retail price elasticity of demand, epsilon ε the farm price elasticity of   
supply, ξ measures departures from competition in selling the finished product at retail,  
() 1 , 0 ∈ ξ  as approaches 1 the market power increases (monopoly/collusion),  () 1 , 0 ∈ θ  plays 
a similar role in terms of procurement of the farm product as theta approaches 1 the market 
power increases (monopsony/ oligopsony). 
  Thus, extending the base model with Sexton’s framework may be a more realistic 
representation of the chain.  Essentially, individual farm firms may not be able to exercise 
market power, whereas a larger processor may (Paarlberg et al 1999).  Finally, it can also 
account for the influence of agricultural policy instruments, which may affect the 
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XXI. Market  Behavior 
Both the base model and the elaborated model showed that the high quality 
producer’s profit increases with certification.  Thus, if the quality producer also could 
switch from producing low to high quality, the profit could potentially increase.  An 
interesting extension is to allow producers producing a range of high and low quality 
products, e.g. free exit and entry.  Marette et al and Motta shows that in general, all high 
quality producers will label their high quality products, and the rest low quality producers 
supply the fringe demand.  In fact, Motta shows that the equilibrium is characterized by a 
high degree of product differentiation, independently of the chosen cost structure (1993: p. 
114).  In practice, Scandinavian farmers may certify a proportion of the farm, or certify the 
whole production as organic according to the KRAV rules (organic labeling organization). 
 
XXII. Summary and Discussions  
This essay has analyzed the implications of certification on the food marketing 
chain.  A frequently occurring problem with food purchase is that the quality of the food is 
rarely observed prior to purchase.  Rather, since food is an experience or credence 
characteristic good, there is a mismatch, or asymmetry, between a consumer’s desire for 
quality and what is actually produced by the producer.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
there is a positive welfare impact when producers choose to label their products. 
The theoretical construct of the Marette et al model shows an unambiguous 
improvement in welfare, when high quality producers certify their products.  On the other 
hand, the modified model shows that the welfare impact of certification is ambiguous 
when varying the number of firms providing low quality.  When there is less low quality 
than high quality firm, the welfare impact is negative of a certification scheme.  For 
reasonable parameter values, the welfare decreases as firms providing low quality products 
increase.  However, the welfare impact is strictly increasing when increasing the number of 
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Since the cost of production is assumed zero for all firms, the driving story behind 
these latter results is the specification of demand.  The market for high quality products is 
relatively inelastic.  Consequently, the high quality producers find it profitable to decrease 
quantity thus earning higher profits.  Although the low quality firms increase, the high-
quality producers do not adjust the production level.  On the other side is the demand for 
low products, which is more elastic, and the five low quality producers faces a fringe 
demand as the number of firms providing high quality increases. 
 
The study proposes by in large three major revisions to the model developed by Marette et 
al.  First, instead of using a linear utility function that serves as a linear approximation to 
any utility function; it is deemed appropriate to first a concrete representation of consumer 
behavior using a second order Taylor-series approximation to consumer demand: where 
consumers’ decision parameters include prices for both certified and uncertified products.  
Second, rather than assuming a zero unit of production, it is deemed appropriate to extend 
the framework by developing an underlying production technology with associate marginal 
cost.  Third and lastly, the current model setup does not allow low quality producers to 
supply high quality goods.  This is a rather abstract assumption, however, and should be 
extended to allow producers to interchangeably supply both high and low quality products, 
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XXIV. Appendix 
Appendix contains the analytical derivations of the results with a general number of 
low quality producers, nL, high quality, kH, and low quality, kL, and two high quality 
producers.  Recall that the base scenario assumes that nL=5, nH=2, and that the high quality 
parameter kH is equal to unity, whereas the low quality parameter kL is zero.   
 
XXV.  Nash-Cournot: no certification 
Expected quality with no certification: 
 

















replace kL =0, the expression for the expected quality is:  l h n k k + = 2 * 2 .  The marginal 
consumer has the taste parameter:  k p/ 0 = θ .  Total demand can be described as: 
 
(***)     k p Q / 1 1 0 − = − = θ . 
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FOC:  
 






1 ] 1 [ 0 ] 1 [ * ] [ ] 1 [
= ≠









Solve for the optimal quantity, 
H q1 :  ) 2 ( 1 1 1 l
H n q Q q + − = − =  =>  1 ) 2 ( = + + l n q q , the optimal 
output level for each firm is:  8 1 ) 3 ( 1 = + = l n q , and the total market output is 
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(***)   = + − = − = )] 2 ( 1 [ ] 1 [ l n q k Q k p () ()() () = + + − ∗ + l l l H n n n k 3 2 1 2 * 2 
() () () 56 * 2 3 2 * 2 H l l H k n n k = + + =  , 
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Consequently, the total welfare with no certification is equal to 
 


















= + + = ∑ ∑ π π .   
 
XXVI. Nash-Cournot with certification 
The marginal consumer can be identified as  p kh − = 0 0 θ Æ  h k p = 0 θ , and the 
inverse demand is  ] 1 [ Q k p h − = . 
The profit for each of the two high quality producers is: 
 
(***)   2 * 1 C q p
h − = π  =  2 * ] 1 [ 1 C q Q k
H
h − −  =  2 ] 1 [ 1 2 1 C q q q kh − − − ,  
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FOC: 
 
(***)   ] 1 [ * ] [ ] 1 [ 1
1





q k Q k
q
π








h q Q k ,  
and solving for q1  we get the best response function:  ()( ) 2 1 2 2
*
1 q q q − = .  Since both high 
quality producers have the same marginal cost, they have identical best response functions.  




1 = = q q , and the market clearing price is 
] 1 [ Q k p h


















kh −  

 
 − −  =  2 9 1 C kh − . 
The consumer surplus is: 
 
(***)   () θ θ
θ d p k CS
e
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Consequently, the total welfare under certification is:  
 
(***)   C k CS W H
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XXVII. Collusion with certification 
The cartel’s profit:  
 
(***)   C Q p collusion − = * π  =  C Q Q kh − − * ] 1 [,  
F.O.C.: 
 
(***)   ] [ ] 1 [ Q k Q k
Q
h h − − =
∂
∂π




− − Q Q kh ,  




1 = = q q , and  ] 1 [ Q k p h
e − =  =  2 h k .   















The producer profit is:  
 
(***)   2
* * C q p
e − ∗ = π  =  2 8 C kh − . 
 
The consumer surplus is: 
 
(***)   () θ θ
θ d p k CS
e
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so the total welfare is equal to:  ( ) C k collusive CS W H
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XXVIII.  Base model: summary of scenarios 
The table below provides a summary of the base model developed by Marette et al.  The 
model is programmed in GAMS as a mixed complementarity problem (see appendix).   
Table 5.  Qualitative summary of Marette's paper. 
Strategy Output  level Market  clearing 
prices 

























































W = CS + PS 



















p =  CS= h k
9
2







kh −  
W = CS + PS 


















p =  CS= h k
8
1
  2 8
* C kh − = π  
W = CS + PS 
= 0.125 + 
2*0.05= 0.225 
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XXIX. Modification of demand: no certification  
  Expected quality of the products is:  
 
(***)   l h k low k high k * ) Pr( * ) Pr( + =  = () ( ) l l l h n k n k + ∗ + ∗ 2 2 . 
The marginal consumer has the taste parameter  k p/ 0 = θ .  Consequently, total demand is:  
 
(***)   k p Q / 1 1 0 − = − = θ . 
The profit is defined as: 
 






i m m m
l , ] 1 [ ] 1 [
2
1 1 ∀ ∈ ⋅ − − ⋅ = ⋅ − = ⋅ = ∑ ∑ = = π , 
and the F.O.C. is: 
 
(***)   { 43 42 1
0 0
] 1 [ 0 ] 1 [ * ] [ ] 1 [
= ≠







m q Q k q k Q k
q
π , 
and the output level per firm is  8 1 ) 3 ( 1 = + = L n q , and the total market output is 
8 7 ) 3 ( ) 2 ( = + + = L L n n Q .   
The marginal consumer is located at the distance  () 8 1 3 1 1 0 = + = − = L n Q θ .  Since 
consumer have utility of consuming low quality products,  0 ≠ l k , the market-clearing 
price is somewhat different from the base model: 
 




⋅ = => = 0 0 θ θ Æ  ()
() () L L








2  Æ H L





Profit for each firm is:  
 
(***)   () ( ) ( ) ( )
2 3 2 2 l l l l h m n n k n k + + ∗ + ∗ =
∗ π .   
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The consumer surplus is:  
 
(***)   () θ θ
θ d p k CS
e ∫ − =
1
0







L L H L
n
k n k n
+
⋅ + ⋅ +





The total welfare is: 
 
(***) 




























+ ⋅ + ⋅




45 .   
Thus, in the scenario with no certification, but where the consumers have 
preferences for low quality products yields a higher welfare, than when kL=0, ceteris 
paribus:  
 








0   
 
XXX.  Modified demand: Certification 
This particular model has two types of marginal consumers: those indifferent 
between buying either product, and those indifferent between buying nothing and the low 
quality product.    First, the marginal consumer that is indifferent between consuming 
either product is described by the taste parameter θ0: 
 
(***)   L L H H p k p k − = − 0 0 θ θ , 
or, alternatively: 
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The marginal consumer at θ00 is indifferent between consuming nothing and the 
low quality product.  Solving for θ00: 
 




= 0 , 0 θ
 
The demand for the low quality product is: 
 













and the inverse demands are: 
 
(***)   L L H H H H k Q k Q k p − − = , 
and 
 
(***)   () L L H L k Q Q p − − = 1 . 
Since  0 ≠ L k , the demands are inversely dependent on the degree of substitutability.   
Hence, this case is similar to the product differentiation case. 
   The profit for the high quality producer is: 
 
(***)   () 2 * 1 1 1 C q k Q k Q k q p
H
L L H H H
H H − − − = = π , 
with F.O.C.: 
 
(***)   () 0 1
1
1 = − − − =
∂
∂ H
H L L H H H H
H
q k k Q k Q k
q
π . 















k q k Q k
i q q q
⋅
⋅ − ⋅ −
= =
2
5 .. 1 , , 2
2 1
. 
By analogy, the profit for the (first) low quality producer is: 
 
(***)   ()
L
L L H
L L q k Q Q q p 1 1 1 1 ⋅ ⋅ − − = ⋅ = π , 
and the first order condition is: 
 
(***)   () 0 1 1
1





L L H H L
L
k q k Q k Q
q
π , 
so the best response function for the (first) low quality producer is: 
 



















q Q q . 
The optimal output levels for each firm is found by solving the systems of best response 




i .. 1 ,
* * = ∀ = , 
so: 
 











by analogy, the optimal output level for each of the two high-quality firms is: 
 
(***)   [] 2 .. 1
10 18
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and the corresponding market clearing price for high quality products with certification is: 
 
(***)   ()
L H
h l h
  h k k
k k 5 - k 6










l k 10 - k 18
k k
  = p
⋅ ⋅
⋅ , 
and the marginal consumer between buying the high or low quality product is defined as: 
 
(***)    
L H
H





and the marginal consumer between buying the low quality product and nothing is defined 
as: 
 
(***)    
L H
H
00 k 10 - k 18
k
=   θ
⋅ ⋅
, 
and the profit for the high quality producers are: 
 





k k 5 - k 6





l h H H





= =π π , 



















i π , 
The consumers’ surplus from consuming the high quality products are: 
 

















− = − =∫ H H H H p
k
d p k CS







k 5 - k 9
k 5 - k 6 k 3
⋅ ⋅
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 
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− = − =∫ L L L L p
k
d p k CS
L  =  ()
()










so the total consumer surplus is: 
 









k 5 - k 9




⋅ = + = . 
The analytical expression for total welfare is: 
 
(***)   ( )
()
C
k 5 - k 9











i TOT ion Certificat −
⋅ ⋅
⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅




π π . 
 
XXXI. Modified demand: summary 
Numerical estimates for the no-certification and certification scenario are summarized in 
the table below.  Collusive action is omitted, since the producer always has incentive to 
deviate from collusive quantity due to the existence of positive marginal profit.  
 
Table 6.  Numerical estimates with the extended Marette model. 
Strategy Numerical  estimates
*  
 Output  level  Prices  Consumers’ 
surplus 
Producers’ profit 
(per producer)  Total welfare 
          
No 
certification 
qL= qH= .125 
Q=.875  p




qH = .269 
qL = .077 
QH = .538 
QL =.385 
pH = .538 
pL = .077  
CSLow = .089 
CSHigh = .393 
CSTOT  = .482 
πH = .145 
πL = .006 
W = .741 
* Base model programmed in GAMS with the following parameter values: nh=2; nl=5; kl=1; kh=2; C=0.15 
The result from collusive behavior is not presented here, as it is not a Nash equilibrium 
 